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This paper seeks to provide a better understanding of what makes boards effective. We analyse the relationships between 
board demography and company performance and between working structures and board tasks in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). We test our hypotheses on a sample of 307 Spanish SMEs. The main empirical result is the negative 
impact that the proportion of outside directors and the board size have on firm performance. We also find a negative impact 
of outsiders’ presence and a positive impact of director tenure on the board’s service role. Our analysis of the role of board 




The debate about the efficiency of corporate governance 
mechanisms has focused on corporate boards of directors (De 
Andrés, Azofra & Lopez, 2005), specifically on the 
relationship between board demographic characteristics and 
company performance (Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009). 
Literature on corporate governance has primarily applied 
agency theory to explore the impact of several directors’ 
demographic attributes on firm performance (Aguilera, 
Filatotchev, & Jackson, 2008). Previous studies implicitly 
assume that demographic variables are more significant than 
behavioural or process variables because they are directly 
observable and hence serve as more reliable and valid 
measures (Pfeffer, 1973). Nevertheless, related empirical 
evidence is ambiguous about the relationship between board 
demography and firm performance (Minichilli, Zattoni & 
Zona, 2009). The contribution of boards to firm success may 
not always reach its full potential (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 
2000). Many researches argue that the effective functioning 
of boards can have effects on the firm performance (Zahara 
& Pearrce 1989). Some boards do not perform well, due, for 
example, to poor structures or processes, inappropriate 
composition, or CEO domination (Zahra & Pearce 1989; 
Baixauli-Soler & Sanchez-Marin, 2015). 
 
Hence, it might be interesting to analyse the board’s working 
structures and processes and their effect on performance. 
Scholars have argued that the use of demographic variables 
in the presence of complex group dynamics, as in boardroom 
decision-making, cannot predict board or firm performance 
(e.g. Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996). 
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In this sense, despite management scholars’ increasing 
attention to boards of directors, scant evidence on the 
antecedents of board task performance has emerged 
(Gabrielsson & Winlund 2000; Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 
2009). Following Forbes & Milliken (1999), we considered 
board task performance as the board’s ability to perform its 
control and service tasks effectively. The antecedents of 
board task performance relate to organizing and conducting 
board meetings and reflecting board work periodically. This 
represents the degree to which the boards fulfil their control 
and service roles.  
 
Most research on corporate governance and boards has 
focused, theoretically and empirically, on large corporations 
(Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). 
However, researchers and managers also acknowledge the 
importance of well-functioning boards of directors to small 
and medium sized private firms, as good governance 
practices seem to create firm value, improve company 
structures, and enhance (financial) results and continuity 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Johannisson & Huse, 2000). Small 
firms represent a unique setting with regard to board tasks and 
functioning (Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007). 
 
Based on these observations, the aim of this study is to 
analyse the direct links between board demographic variables 
(i.e. composition, size, activity, and leadership) and firm 
performance, and to empirically test the impact of the board 
working structures and processes on board task performance 
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Our main 
empirical finding is the negative impact of the proportion of 
outside directors and the board size on firm performance. 




performance reveals the negative impact of the presence of 
outsiders, and the positive impact of director tenure, on the 
board service role. The analysis of the board’s control role 
highlights the negative relationship between this variable and 
CEO tenure. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on boards of directors 
in several ways. Firstly, it enhances our understanding of 
what makes boards effective. In this sense, our empirical 
examination moves beyond board demographic 
characteristics to consider outcome variables besides 
corporate financial performance. This purpose was pursued 
through an empirical test of the impact of several board 
characteristics on board performance. Secondly, recent 
studies point out that contextual perspectives are needed to 
assess the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance, to demonstrate that, in some contexts, 
certain board designs may be recommended, but, in other 
contexts, other designs may be more suitable (Minichilli, 
Zattoni, Nielsen, & Huse, 2012; García-Ramos & García-
Olalla, 2014). In keeping with those studies, we focus our 
analysis on Spanish SMEs. As mentioned, most studies on 
boards of directors are limited to large listed firms and, with 
few exceptions, this type of analysis has been conducted on 
SMEs. Moreover, as Basco & Voordeckers (2015) point out, 
Spain provides an interesting laboratory for examining these 
firms because formal institutions such as the weak legal 
system in protecting minority shareholders, informal 
institutions such as the high overlap between family and 
business and high levels of ownership concentration (La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Arosa, Iturralde & 
Maseda, 2010; Gupta & Levenburg, 2010; Sánchez-Marin, 
Baixauli-Soler & Lucas-Perez, 2011) may affect the board of 
directors. Moreover, this paper also considers the formal 
working structures that operate to maximize board 
performance. The authors link this process to the need for an 
effective and clearly defined working style on the board 
(Demb & Neubauer 1992). The authors explore the 
antecedents of board task performance by testing hypotheses 
on existing formal board structures and board member 
involvement. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the theoretical basis and presents the hypotheses to 
be tested. Section 3 outlines the data and analytical 
procedures used in this empirical study. Section 4 presents 
and discusses the main results. Section 5 closes with the 
conclusions, implications for management theory and 
practice, and limitations of this research.  
 
Theoretical background and hypotheses 
 
Board characteristics and firm performance 
 
Corporate governance and its link to firm value have become 
increasingly interesting to scholars in recent years. Much 
attention has been paid to board characteristics and their 
impact on firm performance. One of the most plausible 
explanations is based on the agency and resource dependency 
theories (Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009).  
This paper focuses on the link between firm value and several 
corporate governance issues. The most common measures of 
board demography have been board size, the ratio of 
inside/outside directors, and CEO duality (Gabrielsson & 
Winlund 2000). We also examine the effect of another 
important board dimension – the intensity of board activity 
(Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). 
 
Board composition  
 
In the context of corporate governance, agency theory implies 
that adequate monitoring mechanisms must be established to 
protect shareholders from management’s self-interest. 
Outside directors are supposed to be guardians of shareholder 
interests via monitoring. Therefore, a high proportion of 
outside directors on a board could improve performance 
through their monitoring role (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997).  
 
Several other theoretical perspectives have been used to 
explain the roles and composition of corporate boards. 
According to resource dependence theory, outsiders may be 
seen as a link between the firm and its environment and may 
help managers achieve organizational goals (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996). These directors are 
knowledgeable, powerful people who utilize their personal 
networks to improve the firm’s legitimacy and reputation and 
to increase the stock of resources it controls (Pfeffer, 1973; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Access to external financing 
resources is a critical growth factor for SMEs, which tend to 
have fewer alternatives for managing their resource 
dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, the 
resource dependence role of the board may become more 
important in these firms (Pfeffer 1973; Daily & Dalton, 
1993). Outside directors can thus be an effective mean of 
overcoming the human resource limitations that often plague 
small firms (Huse, 1990; Daily & Dalton, 1993). Outside 
directors increase supervision, offer independent decision-
making, and increase professional knowledge about the 
business. Accordingly, we present the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: In SMEs, the proportion of outside directors is 
positively associated with firm performance. 
 
Size of the board  
 
One of the most frequently analysed variables in studies of 
corporate governance is the size of the board. The effect of 
board size on firm performance is not clear (Bennedsen, 
Kongsted & Nielsen 2008; Barroso, Villegas & Pérez-Calero, 
2010). A board of directors with many links to the external 
environment will improve the access of the company to 
various resources, thus improving corporate governance and 
firm performance. Some empirical evidence has suggested 
that increased board size may positively affect firm 
performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Van den Berghe & 
Levrau, 2004; García-Ramos & García-Olalla, 2014). 
Proponents of this view argue that a larger board will produce 
a greater depth of knowledge and, therefore, improve the 




On the other hand, while a board’s abilities can increase as 
more directors are added, the benefits can be outweighed by 
the costs of poorer communication, coordination and, 
decision-making associated with larger groups (Cheng, 
2008). According to Jensen (1993), large corporate boards 
may be less efficient due to difficulties in solving the agency 
problem among members. Yermack (1996) shows that small 
boards of directors are more effective and the firms with small 
boards achieve higher market value. For instance, some 
authors find an inverse relationship between firm value and 
board size (Yermack, 1996). 
 
Taking into account these arguments and following De 
Andrés & Rodríguez (2009) and García-Ramos & García 
Olalla (2011a), we propose that the effect of board size on 
firm performance can be seen as a trade-off between benefits 
and drawbacks. Therefore, the expected relationship between 
board size and firm performance will be non-linear. We thus 
propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: In SMEs, the relationship between board size and 
firm performance is an inverted U-shape. 
 
Board activity  
 
Board activity is an important aspect of the internal structure 
of boards. Jackling & Johl (2009) measure board activity as 
the frequency of board meetings, which helps indicate 
whether the board of directors is active or passive. The 
frequency of board meetings can also offer information on the 
importance of the board, since a greater number of meetings 
implies that more information is provided to the members and 
that more issues are decided. Board meetings are the most 
common venue for discussing and exchanging ideas to 
monitor managers (Conger, Finegold & Lawler, 1998). 
Therefore, the more frequent the meetings are, the more 
detailed the control over managers and the greater the 
shareholder wealth. Lipton & Lorsch (1992) suggest that a 
greater frequency of meetings is positively associated with 
performance. Similarly, Conger, Finegold & Lawler, (1998) 
point out that board meeting time is an important resource for 
improving board effectiveness. Based on these arguments, we 
propose the third hypothesis: 
 
H3: In SMEs, the board activity (in terms of meeting 
frequency) is positively associated with firm performance. 
 
Board leadership  
Another aspect to consider when analysing board structure is 
the duality of the chairperson and chief executive roles. The 
debate is whether the firm’s CEO should serve 
simultaneously as the chairperson of the board or whether 
these roles should be separately held (Daily & Dalton 2011). 
In fact, this debate has been prevalent in literature on boards 
of directors for some time (Braun & Sharma, 2007).  
 
The CEO duality discussion has been developed in the large 
firm context (Machold, Huse, Minichilli & Nordqvist, 2011), 
where monitoring and control tasks of the board have been 
prioritized (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). The agency-theoretic 
arguments for the separation of CEO/chairperson roles are 
disputed. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that CEO duality 
violates the principle of separation of decision-management 
and decision-control and hinders the board’s ability to 
perform its monitoring functions. The chairman performs 
important control functions, so it is often suggested that a 
separate person apart from the CEO should occupy this 
position. However, non-duality also has its costs (Faleye, 
2007). According to Brickley, Coles & Jarrell (1997), 
prominent among these is information sharing costs between 
the CEO and a nonexecutive chairman. Naturally, CEOs have 
unique, firm-specific information about production and 
competitive conditions. Theoretically, stewardship theory 
contests both the assumptions and prediction of agency 
theory and proposes instead CEO/chair duality (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Empirically, there is no 
conclusive evidence of any systematic relationship between 
CEO/ chairperson leadership structure and firm performance 
(Machold, Huse, Minichille & Nordqvist, 2011). 
Nonetheless, the consensus among shareholder activists, 
institutional investors, and regulators appears to be that the 
CEO should not also serve as board chairman (Faleye, 2007).  
 
Small firms differ from large ones in several important ways; 
their more concentrated ownership structures make CEO 
duality a much more common phenomenon in the small 
business setting (Machold, Huse, Minichilli & Nordqvist, 
2011). Thus, in this context, the CEO and board chairperson 
positions are usually held by one person, a practice that has 
drawn much criticism from the agency theory perspective 
(Pugliese & Wenstop, 2007). Arguments in favour of CEO 
duality can be found in the literature (Cabrera-Suarez & 
Matin-Santana 2015). If the chief executive behaves as a 
steward, CEO satisfaction is tied to that of the other 
stakeholders in the firm, which means that the decision-
making capacity in this person will be positive for the firm 
(Chen & Hsu, 2009). In this way, duality will be an advantage 
insofar as it would provide the firm with a clear focus and 
unity of command at the highest management levels (Braun 
& Sharma, 2007). Accordingly, we propose the fourth 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: In SMEs, the separation between the CEO and the 
chairperson is negatively associated with firm 
performance. 
 
Antecedents of board task  
 
Taking into account that there is scant evidence on the 
antecedents of board task performance (Minichilli, Zattoni & 
Zona, 2009), we explore the effects of the board working style 
as antecedents on board task performance. Following Forbes 
& Milliken (1999), we considered board task performance as 
the board’s ability to perform its control and service tasks 
effectively. 
 
Control entails the supervision of management and the 
protection of shareholders (Fama & Jensen 1983). The board 
exercises control over managers so that they act in a manner 




Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009). According to agency 
theory, rooted in economics and finance, agents are 
opportunistic and strongly motivated to profit from the 
information asymmetry between them and their principals 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To accomplish control tasks, 
board members should scrutinize top executives’ behaviors 
and actively monitor firm performance to satisfy both 
shareholders’ and stakeholders’ expectations (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). Therefore, the board´s control task is viewed 
as an internal control mechanism aimed at mitigating these 
moral hazard problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Following 
this premise, agency scholars believe that the primary task of 
boards of directors is to safeguard shareholders’ interests 
from management misappropriation (Shleifer &Vishny, 
1997). As such, board control is increasingly considered as a 
primary measure of boards’ effectiveness, and thus it is 
subject to severe public scrutiny (Minichilli, Zattoni, Nielsen 
& Huse 2012). 
 
The board´s service task refers to its ability to participate 
actively in the formulation of strategy and provide advice and 
counsel to the CEO and other top managers (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999), and to control inter-organizational 
dependencies and act as a strategic resource for securing 
critical firm resources (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). The service role highlights the fact that the directors’ 
knowledge, skills, and experiences can support and 
complement the management of the firm (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Through the provision of advice and counsel, the 
board of directors can complement the management team´s 
knowledge base (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005). According to 
the resource dependence theory (Daily & Dalton, 1993; 
Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), boards of directors 
perform a service task and are supposed to bring multiple 
types of resources to the firm. This service role has been 
considered to be of critical importance in small firms where 
internal competence can be scarce in many cases (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999), 
 
Board composition  
 
According to the rationale behind the control role, outsiders 
have an obligation to ensure that management operates in the 
interests of shareholders. This obligation is fulfilled through 
the board’s scrutiny, evaluation, and regulation of the actions 
of top management (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). This task 
consists mainly of monitoring the firm’s corporate financial 
performance (Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009). Boards with 
a majority of outside directors are believed to be more 
effective in the control role because these directors may be 
less susceptible to the CEO’s influence (Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996). 
 
The service role and the board of directors, especially the 
outside directors, may be considered as a bundle of strategic 
resources to be used by and within the small firm. They can 
provide timely advice and counsel to the CEO and 
management in areas where knowledge is limited or lacking 
(Gabrielson & Huse, 2005). 
 
It has been argued that the board needs to be independent and 
free from the self-interest bias in order to fulfil its 
responsibilities effectively (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Demb 
& Neubauer, 1992). An independent board can introduce a 
broader set of considerations involving stakeholder interests, 
public responsibilities, and relevant industry trends. In the 
same way, independent boards may be better informed and 
thus better able to support management with advice and 
information (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). Accordingly, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: In SMEs, the proportion of outside directors is 




In addition to board activity, the importance of good 
preparation before meetings is often emphasized in research 
on board practices (Gallo, 2001). However, the effects are 
seldom studied (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). Some 
evidence suggests that the association between meeting 
frequency and firm performance is more complex than 
previously reported (Vafeas, 1999). It would be interesting to 
include questions related to the quality of meetings, such as 
the extent to which they are used for routine tasks rather than 
substantive issues (Jackling & Johl, 2009). 
 
As stated in Gallo (2001), the degree to which a board may 
be considered active partially depends on how far in advance 
directors receive the agenda and the information needed to 
properly prepare for the meeting. Otherwise, meetings can 
become purely informative, where the president will state the 
points of the day, and the directors may barely discuss the 
information if they have not had time to analyse it. Without 
proper preparation, valuable time can be spent on discussions 
about figures rather than facts (Huse, 1995). 
 
It has been argued that directors must be prepared for the 
meetings as well as involved and committed during them if 
they are to perform both the control and service roles 
(Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). Hence, well-prepared and 
committed directors should assist not only in controlling the 
development of the business but also in helping and 
supporting the management when facing uncertainty (Huse, 
1995). We thus propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H6: In SMEs, the meeting preparation is positively 




The level of board involvement is connected to the directors’ 
and CEO’s use of knowledge and skills, measured by their 
training and the CEO’s and directors’ length of tenure. 
 
Board members will have different kinds of knowledge and 
skills due to their different backgrounds and experiences 





Use of knowledge and skills refers to ‘‘the board’s ability to 
tap the knowledge and skills available to it and then apply 
them to its tasks’’ (Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 495). Directors 
must actively use their knowledge and skills during meetings, 
which is another hallmark of involvement (Huse, 1998; 
Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The use of knowledge and skills is 
associated with the process by which board members 
contributions are coordinated, and specifically refers to the 
flows of information among board members, the clear 
division of tasks and responsibilities, and the awareness board 
members should have of each other’s competences and areas 
of expertise (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Their knowledge and 
skills can be measured by the directors’ job training; 
therefore, better training may be related to stronger 
knowledge. Increased board expertise can enhance the 
directors’ involvement in decisions and make the board more 
active (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). A director's 
knowledge and skills is recognized as an attribute in the 
board´s work (Zahra & Pearce, 1990). The level of 
involvement is connected to a director’s use of knowledge 
and skills (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). 
 
H7a: In SMEs, the use of knowledge and skills is 
positively associated with the board’s control and service 
roles. 
 
The second aspect to consider is CEO and director tenure. 
The resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Hillman, Cannella 
& Paetzold, 2000) suggests that board members are firm 
resources and should be regarded as being of greater or lesser 
value according to their competence, knowledge, and 
experience (Barney, 1991). Board member´s level of 
knowledge about the firm would increase with tenure 
(Barroso, Villegas & Pérez-Calero, 2011). Long tenure on a 
board brings several benefits (Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 
2011). Longer CEO or director tenure could suggest a long-
term commitment to the firm. Longer tenures facilitate 
lengthy investment time horizons and provide investment 
incentives and stewardship (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 
2006). Longer tenures may thus be related to a better service 
role, given the increased firm knowledge the CEO and 
directors would provide. 
 
However, negative aspects can also appear (Barroso, Villegas 
& Pérez-Calero, 2011). Some studies suggest that long 
tenures are associated with a higher resistance to change 
(Musteen, Barker & Baeten, 2006). Golden & Zajac (2001) 
point out that extended tenures of board members are 
associated with greater rigidity and can result in a 
commitment to existing practices and procedures, as directors 
distance themselves from new ideas. Moreover, according to 
Vafeas (2003), board members who serve longer and have 
greater experience are more likely to form friendships and are 
less likely to supervise management, weakening their control 
role. Rotation facilitates the appearance of new people at the 
helm and therefore different attitudes and views. Based on all 
the above, the following hypothesis are proposed: 
 
H7b: In SMEs, the tenure of board members is positively 
associated with the board’s service roles. 
 
H7c: In SMEs, the tenure of board members is negatively 
associated with the board’s control roles. 
 
Empirical research: method, data, and analysis 
 
Population and sample 
 
We conducted this study on Spanish firms included in the 
SABI (Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System) database for 
2006. The Spanish context was chosen because Spain is a 
representative Continental European country whose legal 
system was developed within the tradition of French civil law 
(Baixauli-Soler & Sanchez-Marin, 2015). Due to its lower 
protection of shareholder interests, both the ownership 
concentration and the proportion of family controlling 
shareholders tend to be higher in countries with this type of 
legal system than in countries whose legal systems originate 
from common law or Scandinavian or German civil law (La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Gupta & 
Levenburg, 2010; García-Ramos & García-Olalla, 2014). 
These characteristics affect the way firms behave and 
compete and, specifically, they affect the board of directors 
(Basco & Voordeckers, 2015). In this regard, organizations 
such as the Spanish Family Firm Institute have developed 
some recommendations aimed at achieving the good 
corporate governance of family businesses, giving special 
attention to non-listed firms (Quintana, 2012). 
 
We imposed certain restrictions on the group of selected 
companies in order to obtain a sample that is representative 
of the population. We eliminated companies affected by 
special situations such as insolvency, winding-up, liquidation 
or zero activity, and we eliminated listed companies and firms 
with more than 50 employees. The resultant sample 
comprised 2,958 non-listed Spanish firms. 
 
A questionnaire was used to obtain information that would be 
unavailable or difficult to acquire for non-listed firms. 
Questionnaire data were collected through telephone 
interviews, which ensured a high response rate, while 
financial reports were obtained from the SABI database. We 
reduced the potential response bias by, first, protecting the 
respondents’ anonymity by assuring them of the 
confidentiality of their responses in the cover letter to the 
survey (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee &  Podsakoff, 2003). 
Second, a non-response analysis revealed no statistically 
significant differences between respondents and non-
respondents with regard to industry branch. Third, we created 
a pre-test to fine-tune the questionnaire and prepared a 
presentation letter emphasizing the need for research on 
boards of directors and the increasing interest in the topic. Of 







Firm profitability, measured as return on assets (ROA), was 




of a firm’s assets to generate profits and is considered to be a 
key factor in determining the firm’s future investments. 
Therefore, it is used as an indicator of firm profitability. The 
ROA has been defined as earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) between total assets and does not take into account 
the firm’s financial performance (Anderson &Reeb, 2003). 
The EBIT is a traditional measurement that does not include 
capital costs but only the operating margin and operating 
income. 
 
Service (SERVICE) and control (CONTROL) roles were 
measured as a dummy variable that  takes the value of 1 if it 




Board composition, representing the composition of the 
board (OUTSIDERS), was calculated as the percentage of 
external directors on the board (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Barontini & Caprio, 2006). This variable measures the 
board’s monitoring capacity in order to analyse its influence 
on firm profitability. 
 
Board size (BOARDSIZE) was measured using the number 
of members of the board of directors (Anderson &Reeb, 
2003; Jackling & Johl, 2009). 
 
Board activity (MEET) was measured as the number of board 
meetings held in a reporting year (García-Ramos & García-
Olalla, 2011b). 
 
Leadership (DUALITY) was measured as a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the chairperson and CEO are the 
same person and 0 otherwise (Braun & Sharma, 2007). 
 
Knowledge (KNOWLEDGE) was measured as a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has studied in a 
university and 0 otherwise. 
 
CEO tenure (CTENURE) and directors’ tenure (DTENURE) 
was measured as the average number of years of tenure. 
Tenure can take three values: 1 if the tenure is less than 4.5 
years, 2 if the tenure is between 4.5 and ten years, and 3 if the 
tenure is longer than ten years. 
 
Meeting preparation (PREPARATION) was measured as a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the directors are 
given notice and information regarding the meeting at least 




Firm size (SIZE) was measured using the natural logarithm 
of total assets (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barontini & Caprio, 
2006; Wang, 2006).  
 
Growth opportunities (GROWTHOP), following Scherr and 
Hulburt (2001), were calculated as Sales0/Sales-1.  
 
Borrowing level (LEV) was measured as the quotient of total 
debt and total assets (Wang, 2006). 
Firm age (AGE) was measured as the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since the establishment of the firm. 
Method 
 
We applied two methods. First, four cross-sectional ordinary 
least-square (OLS) regression models were used to test the 
first four hypotheses, the direct links between board 
demographic variables and firm performance. Second, we 
implemented two logit regressions to test the impact of the 
boards’working structures and processes on board task 
performance, service and control tasks. To test for 
multicollinearity, the VIF was calculated for each 
independent variable. The results (not shown) indicate that all 




Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sample firms. Data of 
database 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Number of observations 307   
ROA (%)  7.46 7.68 
GROWTTHOP (%)  4.56 4.62 
LEV %)  61.39 17.79 
SIZE  43,493.66 110,363.20 
AGE  38.28 24.41 
 
Table 1 and 2 presents the general characteristics of these 
firms. Among the functions of the Board, 53% of the firms 
considered that the service is an important role of the board, 
while decreasing by 42% in the monitoring role. 
 
The significant proportion of outside directors on the boards 
should be noted. In 66% of the firms, the percentage of 
outside directors on the board was less than 50%. The data 
show that the size of most of the boards was less 6 members 
(77.24 %). The proportion of firms in which the chairperson 
and CEO are the same person is 58.90%. 
 
In our first regression, we examined the influence of outside 
directors on firm performance. As noted in Table III (column 
I), the overall model is significant. Contrary to expectations, 
our results show a negative significant relationship (β1= -
0.26) between outsiders and firm performance. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 was not supported. We analysed the effect of 
board size on firm performance in columns II and III. As 
shown in column II, as the coefficients of board size and its 
square are not significant (β1 = -0.04 and β2 = 0.01), the 
expected non-linear relationship between the two variables is 
rejected. However, the results in column III show a negative 
and significant relationship between board size and firm 
performance (β1 = -0.02). In column IV, we analysed the 
combined effect of all variables. For board activity, we 
analysed the relationship between the board’s activity 
(measured by the number of meetings per year) and firm 
performance. We hypothesized a positive relationship 
between the two variables. However, the results do not show 
a significant relationship between the frequency of board 




coefficient is positive, as we expected (β1 = 0.01), its lack of 
significance does not allow us to accept Hypothesis 3.  
 
With regard to leadership structure, we analysed the 
relationship between board leadership and firm performance. 
Our results do not support Hypothesis 4 (that the separation 
of the figures of the CEO and chairperson is negatively 
associated with firm performance). 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of sample firms. Data of Questionnaire 
 
 N % 
SERVICE   
Important  53.2% 
Not Important  46.8% 
CONTTROL   
Important  42.1% 
Not Important  57.9% 
OUTSIDERS   
0-25 percent 159 51.8% 
26-50 percent 42 13.8% 
51-75 percent 46 15.1% 
76-100 percent 60 19.3% 
DUALITY    
No Duality 126 41.1% 
Yes duality 181 58.9% 
MEET   
1-2  83 27.02% 
3-4 99 32.27% 
More than 4 125 40.71% 
BOARDSIZE   
4 or less than 4 members 134 43.7% 
5 or 6 members 100 32.5% 
7 or 8 members 38 12.5% 
9 or 10 members 22 7.1% 
More than 10 members 13 4.3% 
DTENURE   
Less than 4.5 years 35 11.1% 
Between 5.5 and 10 years 37 22.3% 
More than 10 years 206 66.6% 
CENURE   
Less than 4.5 years 70 22.7% 
Between 5.5 and 10 years 108 35.2% 
More than 10 years 138 44.9% 
KNOWLEDGE  76.5% 
PREPARATION  77.3% 
Table 3: Multiple regression 
 
 ROA SERVICE CONTROL 
 I II III IV V VI 
Constant 0.09 0.11 0.910 0.05 0.31 0.33 
OUTSIDERS -0.26**   -0.03** -0.89** 0.14 
BOARDSIZE  -0.04 -0.02** -0.02**   
BOARDSIZE2  0.01     
MEET    0.01   
DUALITY    -0.01 0.67***  
KNOWLEDGE     -0.38 -0.55 
DTENURE     0.28* 0.06 
CTENURE     0.08 -0.96** 
PREPARATION     -0.52 -1.23 
GROWTHOP -0.26*** -0.27*** 0.27*** -0.26*** 0.71 3.14*** 
LEV -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.132 -0.26 
SIZE 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** -0.01 0.05 
AGE -0.14* -0.13** -0.01* -0.01*** -0.25 0.276 
F value 3.53 3.28 3.60 3.04   
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.15   
χ2     17.98 21.39 




Concerning board roles, column V depicts the relationship 
among board composition, preparation for the meeting, 
involvement, and board roles. For service role and board 
independence, our results show a significant negative 
relationship (β1= -0.89). Thus, Hypothesis 5 was not 
supported. The presence of outsiders on the board is 
negatively associated with the board’s service role. With 
respect to Hypothesis 6, the relationship is negative and not 
significant. Thus, Hypothesis 6 was not supported. 
 
Hypothesis 7b was supported. The relationship between 
directors’ tenure and service role was positive and significant 
(β3= 0.28). There was also a positive and significant 
relationship (β2= 0.67) between CEO duality and the board’s 
service role.  
 
Concerning the board’s control role (column VI), the only 
variable with a significant impact was CEO tenure. 
Hypothesis 7c was supported. We find a negative relationship 
between these variables (β4 = -0.96). Longer tenures appear 




This study analyses the direct links between board 
demographic variables (i.e. composition, size, activity, and 
leadership) and firm performance, and empirically tests the 
impact of the boards´ working structures and processes on 
board task performance of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). We identified three antecedents of board 
task performance: board composition, meeting preparation, 
and involvement. To test our hypotheses, we used a sample 
of 307 anonymous Spanish SMEs. 
 
Our main empirical result is the negative impact of the 
proportion of outside directors and board size on firm 
performance. The presence of outside directors does not 
improve firm performance. Despite the greater monitoring, 
advising, and networking capacities attributed to outside 
directors, the sample firms showed a significant presence of 
inside directors, an aspect that may be related to the directors’ 
greater firm knowledge. The presence of inside directors 
seems to have a positive effect on strategic planning 
decisions.  
 
This result is consistent with studies indicating that firms with 
a majority of outside directors have poorer performance 
(Yermack, 1996; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). These results 
appear to contradict the assumption that outside directors 
have an important monitoring, advising and networking 
function. In fact, these results justify the presence of inside 
directors on boards. Many reasons are offered for the negative 
relationship between the presence of outside directors and 
performance. Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) suggest that both 
inside and outside directors may fail to represent 
shareholders’ interests properly—thus, that it cannot be 
assumed that outsiders perform their duty better than insiders. 
Similarly, inside directors offer advice and convey 
knowledge to the CEO concerning the firm’s day-to-day 
operations. The presence of insiders on the board makes it 
easier for the other directors to view them as potential top 
executives, since they can assess their skills by seeing their 
performance on the board (Baghat & Black, 2000). Moreover, 
each type of director has a specific role on the board 
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985). Inside directors have greater firm 
knowledge than outsiders (Raheja, 2005), who are often 
unfamiliar with the working of the firm. Although outsiders’ 
independence makes them react quicker in a crisis, they have 
a greater chance of making mistakes as a result of their lack 
of knowledge. 
 
Our study also shows the negative effect of board size on the 
performance of SMEs, indicating that the benefits of better 
monitoring capacity associated with larger boards are 
outweigh by the disadvantages of poorer coordination, 
flexibility, and communication. This result supports those of 
prior studies (Yermack, 1996; De Andrés, Azofa & Lopez, 
2005) and confirms that small boards are better at improving 
firm performance. As indicated by Jensen (1993), the benefits 
of an increase in board size in our sample seem to be 
outweighed by the problems of poorer coordination, 
communication, and flexibility associated with larger boards. 
Our results contrast with the earlier work of scholars such as 
García-Ramos & García Olalla (2014), Nicholson & Kiel 
(2007), and Van den Berghe & Levrau (2004), who found that 
increasing the number of directors improved firm 
performance.  
 
Regarding board activity, we analysed the relationship 
between the board’s activity (measured by the number of 
meetings per year) and firm performance. The results do not 
show any significant relationship between the frequency of 
board meetings and firm performance. One possible reason 
for this finding is the more complex relationship between 
these two variables or the possibility of a lag effect, which 
would result in boards responding to poor performance by 
increasing board activity, in turn affecting the following 
year’s performance (Vafeas, 1999).  
 
It might be interesting to analyse other aspects, such as how 
far in advance the directors receive the agenda and the 
information needed to properly prepare for the meetings, 
which might indicate whether the directors have had 
sufficient time to analyse the material and prepare for the 
meetings. Otherwise, these meetings can become purely 
informative. As the chairperson sets out the points of the day, 
the directors can hardly participate or understand his or her 
views if they have not had time to consider the information 
received. Most firms in the sample provided the information 
needed to prepare for the meeting just under one week before 
the meeting. The sample firms could therefore have had 
passive boards. 
 
Regarding leadership structure, we analysed the relationship 
between the board’s leadership and firm performance. The 
findings show that, for the firms in our sample, leadership 
structure is not related to firm performance, consistent with 
the prior findings of Vafeas & Theodorou (1998) and Jackling 






We also analysed the relationship among board composition, 
preparation of the meeting, involvement, and board roles. We 
found a negative impact of the presence of outsiders on the 
board service role and a positive impact of director tenure on 
the board service role. The negative relationship between 
board independence and the service role can be explained by 
recalling that insider directorship has better firm knowledge, 
and their experience can improve firm performance and is 
thus more important for the service role. The positive impact 
of directors tenure on the board service role may indicate that 
longer tenures may be related to a better service role due to 
the directors’ increased firm knowledge. The SMEs in our 
sample show that director tenure has a positive effect on firm 
performance, suggesting that longer director tenures are 
associated with higher resistance to change. 
 
It is also important to note the CEO duality effect (when the 
CEO is also the board chairperson): the person will make his 
or her knowledge available to directors, thereby allowing 
them to play their advisory role more effectively (García-
Olalla & García-Ramos, 2010). Surprisingly, the director 
preparation variable is not significant. This result appears to 
contradict the findings of Gabrielsson & Winlund (2000), 
who note that preparation is an important factor in explaining 
board task performance. 
 
If we analyse the board’s control role, the only variable that 
has a significant impact is CEO tenure. Longer tenures seem 
to negatively impact the control role, suggesting that 
extended tenures are associated with greater rigidity and 
friendships, which could weaken monitoring. Our findings 
are consistent with other studies (Musteen, Barker & Baeten, 
2006) and suggest that long tenures are associated with a 
higher resistance to change. 
 
This paper contributes to opening the “black box” of the 
board directors. Firstly, our empirical examination moves 
beyond board demographic characteristics to consider our 
outcome variables besides corporate financial performance. 
This purpose was pursued through an empirical test of the 
impact of several board characteristics on board´s 
performance. As mentioned, most existing studies have been 
limited to large listed firms, and, with few exceptions, this 
type of analysis has been conducted on SMEs. Spain provides 
an interesting laboratory for examining these firms because 
this country features high ownership concentration. because 
formal institutions such as the weak legal system in protecting 
minority shareholders, informal institutions such as the high 
overlap between family and business and high levels of 
ownership concentration may affect the board of directors. 
This article also considers the formal working structures that 
maximize board performance. The authors link this to the 
rationale for an effective and clearly defined working style 
for boards (Demb & Neubauer 1992). In order to explore the 
antecedents of board task performance, the authors test 
hypotheses concerning the existing formal board structures 
and board member involvement. 
 
By testing the relationship between boards of directors’ 
variables and firm performance, our study sheds light on 
SME governance. The results should be of interest to SMEs 
and their advisors. The findings show that outsiders do not 
add value to the firm, perhaps due to the criteria used by 
boards to appoint directors. The selection of outsiders is 
important because they are supposed to add professionalism 
to the board. Therefore, outside directors must be selected 
carefully in order to ensure they are adequately qualified. 
Outsiders must have skills, experience at other firms, 
knowledge of corporate management, and economic 
independence from their compensation. Interestingly, 
consultants recommend that firms have a well-balanced 
equilibrium between outside and inside directors because of 
the important and concrete roles they play (Maseda, Iturralde 
& Arosa 2015).  
 
Our study also points out that it would be beneficial to include 
information on the CEO and directors’ tenures if rotation is 
relatively common and frequent. Rotation indicates how 
efficient the board is. For instance, establishing relatively 
short tenures should help to increase the monitoring capacity 
of this governance body because rotation facilitates the 
appointment of new people to positions of responsibility; 
therefore, attitudes and views will be more pluralistic and 
diverse. 
 
This research does have some limitations. First, our data are 
cross-sectional; therefore, we cannot clearly infer causality. 
Only a panel data sample will allow for the testing and 
complementing of our findings. Second, our data’s 
exclusivity to Spain limits the generalizability of our findings. 
Due to its lower protection of shareholder interests 
(developed within the tradition of French civil law), both the 
ownership concentration and the proportion of family 
controlling shareholders tend to be higher. These 
characteristics affect the way firms behave and compete and, 
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